The “One China” Policy Revisited

                                                        Eisuke Suzuki

     Donald Trump stunned the world by suggesting that the “One China” policy be questioned. He spoke to Ms. Tsai Ing-wen and referred to her as “the President of Taiwan.” She called him on December 3, 2016 to wish him congratulations on winning the Presidency. His suggestion as President-elect came out of the blue and was a radical departure from the long-held US position. Since 1979, the position was there was only one China, and Taiwan was part of China, and that the People’s Republic of China was the sole legitimate government of only that China.

    A reaction from Beijing was swift and threatening. That was expected as the repudiation of the “One-China” policy would deconstruct the carefully crafted fiction on which China’s entire foreign relations have been built since 1949.

    Unhappily, President Trump backed away from his original right position. During a lengthy and “extremely cordial” conversation with President Xi Jinping on February 9, 2017, “President Trump agreed, at the request of President Xi, to honor our one-China policy.”   

    Mr. Trump’s turn around surely helps ease tensions that could have grown to be a serious confrontation between the United States and China; however, the correct question, once raised, won’t go away unless it is properly answered. Mr. Trump’s remark on the “One-China” policy questions anew the appropriateness of the “One China” policy. You cannot put the genie back in the bottle. It is high time we re-examined the root of the policy itself and why the policy has been accepted.    



In the dawn of the Cold War, countries and regions began to be divided reflecting the prevailing ideological boundaries between the free world of the Allies in the West and the communist world of the Soviets in the East. Most notably the Cold War divided Germany between the Federal Republic of Germany, commonly known as West Germany and the German Democratic Republic or East Germany. Eastern European and Central Asian countries either became “union republics” as part of the Soviet Union or were reconstituted as Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

    In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in January 1991, the divided Germany was unified and all these Eastern European and Central Asian countries became separate independent states. The collapse of the Soviet Union also brought about the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia into discrete ethnicity-based states, most recent of which was the independence of Kosovo in 2008 from Serbia which itself became independent from Yugoslavia in 2006.

    In East Asia, too, there were divided states such as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam or North Vietnam and the Republic of Vietnam or South Vietnam until 1975. After the Vietnam War ended, the country was unified under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976.

    Still, there are other separate and divided countries in East Asia. The Republic of Korea or South Korea was established in August 1948, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or North Korea was founded in September 1948. Both South Korea and North Korea became members of the United Nations at the same time in 1991 just like East Germany and West Germany in 1973 before the unification in 1990.

    None of these divided countries insisted on the adoption of a mutually exclusive manner of recognition of a divided country, i.e., a recognizing state is forced to choose one part of the divided country to recognize in denial of the other half. China is the exception to this practice. The Republic of China (ROC) which was one of the major powers at the time of World War II became a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, but the ruling Nationalist Party of the ROC lost war in its internal contest for power against the Chinese Communist Party and fled to the island of Taiwan while the latter proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.         

    Though the government of the PRC effectively ruled mainland China, it was not widely recognized as the legitimate government of China since the Nationalist Chinese government of the ROC was still functioning and claimed that it represented a whole of China as its legitimate government even though the territorial domain of government was confined to the island of Taiwan. That situation was the beginning of the two-China problem, from which the PRC developed the “One China” principle. It is distinct from the “One China” policy as China insists Taiwan is an inalienable part of one China to be reunified one day

    What is extraordinary about the “One China” policy is that the Communist government of the PRC, a new government of China, has dictated any other countries to accept, and comply with, the “One China” principle when it establishes diplomatic relations with them. Thus, any country desirous of establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC must sever its diplomatic relations hitherto enjoyed with the ROC.

    Unhappily, the October 25, 1971 resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations expelled the ROC and recognized the PRC as the legitimate and sole representative of China and restored all the lawful rights of the PRC in the United Nations. Thus, the ROC lost its membership status in all specialized agencies of the United Nations. That would not have happened without Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing in July 1971 and his acknowledgement of Zhou Enlai’s conditions for the establishment of the U.S.-China relations: the United States must recognize that the PRC government ''is the sole legitimate government in China'' and that Taiwan is ''an inalienable part of Chinese territory that must be restored to the motherland.''

    In the February 28, 1972 Shanghai Communique, the United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was but one China and that Taiwan was a part of China. The United States understood that the PRC government firmly opposed any activities to create "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," or an "independent Taiwan."

    On January 1, 1979, the United States, in officially establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, declared that it “recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.” With it, the United States de-recognized the ROC by severing all official dealings with it. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that US recognition of the PRC as “the sole legal government of China” is one thing and the question whether Taiwan is part of China is an entirely separate matter. The Shanghai Communique of January 1, 1979 itself left the question ambiguous: the United States merely acknowledged “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” One must ask, what was the US position, then?

    Nothing is more fitting now to recall George Kennan’s sage advice on the treatment of Taiwan, given in his Foreign Affairs article, “Japanese Security and American Policy” in October 1964. His wisdom and foresight was proven by accurately predicting that “[a]n admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations . . . would almost certainly be followed at once, as things now stand, by full-fledged Japanese diplomatic recognition, whatever the American feeling.” We should take heed of his advice that the United States “take a less doctrinaire position” on its assumption that “the only possible future for the island of Taiwan was as an integral part of China.”  In his view, such rigid assumption stems from the circumstances of Cairo meetings in 1943, and that is the fundamental problem. Instead, he suggested the United States “recognize that the final status of this island, in the light of all that has occurred since 1943, is something which ought ultimately to be determined with due regard to the feelings of the inhabitants and to the needs of peace and stability in the Pacific area generally”.

    As the United States may change its position over time, so will other countries. Remember the United States, after refusing to recognize the PRC for 30 years, suddenly changed its policy. It is entirely possible for the United States to say that its new position is that Taiwan is not a part of China.



What separates the Middle Kingdom from the rest of the world is its worldview that China is the center of the world, and that the rest of the world is uncivilized, and that all other uncivilized nations are allowed to exist in the benevolent protection of, and the enjoyment of the largeness of, the Middle Kingdom so long as such nations accept the authority and power of the Middle Kingdom. As Edward N. Luttwak explains in The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy,

      "Indeed, the greatest benefit extended by the empire to its subjected tributary   neighbors was their inclusion within its ethical as well as political sphere, or rather within the concentric circles of the Tianxia(天下), the “all under heaven” that radiated outwardly from the emperor himself, elevating those nations above outer barbarians living in unrelieved savagery. The tributaries in turn confirmed the ethical as well as the political supremacy of the emperor by their deferential obeisance."


    In short, China dictates that any country wishing to deal with China accepts the definitions given by China and comply with the rules established by China and behave according to the gospel played by the Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. 

    The fundamental international law principle today is the equality of sovereign states, be they powerful or small. The sovereign equality principle is the foundation for the conduct of international relations and for the establishment of the United Nations, but the tributary system that has been deeply embedded in the Chinese worldview rules out such international dealings on the basis of sovereign equality. Thus, many aspects of China’s conduct in international relations do not conform to the general practice accepted as international standards. Worse, China openly rejects international decisions, the most recent of which was the 2016 judgment of the South China Sea arbitration case filed by the Philippines about the unlawfulness of the “Nine-dash Line” claimed by China. Beijing called the decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration as an “ill-founded” ruling that was “naturally null and void,” and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi called it as a “political farce under the pretext of law.”             

    China’s most preferred mode of negotiation is “bi-lateral negotiation” between the two parties directly concerned with the issue at stake, rejecting the involvement of any outside parties. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi declared in 2010: “Turning the bilateral issue into an international, or multilateral one would only worsen the situation and add difficulties to solving the issue.” China has always insisted that disputes should be “peacefully resolved through negotiations between the countries directly concerned.” China thus deals with one country at a time from the position of strength, in Luttwak’s words, in “[t]he inherently uneven bilateralism of the tributary system.”

    Beijing’s leadership holds that the traditional Chinese vision of world order, i.e., the tributary system under tianxia underpins “a universal authority in the moral, ritualistic, and aesthetic framework of a secular high culture, while providing social and moral criteria for assessing fair, humanitarian governance and proper social relations.” Such conviction has led Beijing’s leadership to form self-righteous and arrogant predispositions about the conduct of international relations, and it has, in turn, ingrained the Chinese public in general the sense of infallibility in the carrying out of the official policies pronounced by the government. Examples both in international relations and domestic affairs abound. The former is epitomized by China’s building of the artificial islands and the installation of military facilities on them in the South China Sea in utter defiance of international law, not to mention China’s voracious appetite for all kinds of maritime resources wherever they are located―high seas, or territorial seas and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other states. The latter is attested to by the numerous cases of not only environmental degradation in air, river, lake, and soil of and around residential areas, but also, more shockingly, of the prevalent circulation of toxic manufactured products and processed food which people use and consume daily.



China engages in its outward expansion nonchalantly in pursuit of “the great national renewal” with impunity and in defiance of international norms and practice. Take the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), for example. The idea of establishing the AIIB was not born in the course of multilateral cooperation or consultation process in which the purpose and objectives of the proposed international institution were discussed and deliberated by all the parties concerned. But it came about as the policy decision and directive of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. 

    The principal aim of the AIIB is, I suspect, to use it as a financial vehicle to achieve a grandiose project referred to as “The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road” or otherwise known as “the Belt and Road Initiative” which was originally announced in its outline form by President Xi Jinping in September 2013. It is to create a vast economic zone embracing a new Eurasian economic belt in the north and a new maritime route in the south starting from the eastern seaboard of China through the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Middle Eastern and East African countries to the EU. The AIIB is a vehicle to realize that Chinese dream.    

    Of course, there are countries which will benefit from it. The lure of China’s massive market is irresistible. Every country is dazzled by the sheer size of the landmass and population of China just the way the major powers flocked to Qing in 19th century. It is the same natural expectations that prompted the United States to demand the “Open Door Policy” toward China in 1899. But today’s China is not the same as Qing, but is on its course of “the realization of Chinese dream of the great national renewal.”

    Let us recall Richard Nixon’s basic rationale of accepting the “One-China” policy. He wrote in his 1967 Foreign Affairs article, “Asia After Viet Nam”:

     "The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring . . . . ”

    Nixon knew that he was undertaking a huge strategic gamble in suggesting, for the short run, a policy of persuading Beijing “that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility” and, for the long run, of “pulling China back into the world community---but as a great and progressing nation, not as the world epicenter of world revolution.” Regrettably, the strategic gamble in engaging with, and cultivating and developing, China by accommodating Chinese demands has not yielded the intended results as detailed in Michael Pillsbury’s The Hundred-Year Marathon. The Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 was an awakening call to realize that industrialized and liberal democratic countries’ engaging and strengthening China did not bring about any improvement in political freedom. The rationale for accepting the “One China” policy has long lost its raison d’être.

    China demands respect and a place in the world community commensurate to its economic and military power, as in demanding a “new type of major power relations” with the United States, but when it comes to the promotion of, and compliance with, internationally accepted standards of conduct, not only does China conveniently present itself as a developing country, but it defies international norms.

    The ultimate purpose of the AIIB is to promote a China-centric worldview in the form of authoritarian capitalism in defiance of liberal economic and democratic principles. China knows that its phenomenal rise has nothing to do with democracy. It has offered an alternative model by successfully promoting its brand of Chinese authoritarian capitalism as part of its mercantilist foreign policy.

    It is not only utter folly, but an oxymoron for liberal and democratic countries to support China’s authoritarian and undemocratic capitalism promoted by its mercantilist foreign policy by accepting China’s definitions and rules. It is the time of reckoning to decide whether there are more important values and principles at stake than economic and commercial gains.



Taiwan is a de facto state simply because it was de-recognized by the same governments that used to have normal international relations with the ROC, due to the “One-China” policy. Taiwan has a democratic government and a thriving economy. It engages in a wide range of international activities with other states, albeit “unofficially,” and is contributing to the peace and prosperity of the world.

   The “One China” policy is bound to become an historical relic. It is an eventual consequence of “the paradoxical logic of strategy,” to use Luttwak’s concept, that is being activated “through the reactions of all other powers large and small that have started to monitor, resist, deflect, or counter Chinese power.” Recent developments in Hong Kong clearly indicate the so-called “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan with China envisaged at the time of accepting the “One China” policy will not happen. The time is on Taiwan’s side: history has long passed reunification by. The Taiwan Strait is a symbol of the permanent separation of Taiwan from China. China’s sending of its aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, through the Taiwan Strait in January 2017 has made the separation permanent.

    What should Taiwan do to legitimatize the separation of Taiwan from China, short of declaring the independence of Taiwan? President Tsai said she would continue to maintain the status quo policy. It means Taiwan should continue building up a de facto reality incrementally on the status quo which is developing. It should begin with establishing a new national identity by not referring to the country as “the Republic of China” that does not exist under international law, but using “Taiwan” and “Taiwanese.” And quietly ask other countries to do the same. No formal instruction or decree is needed for this de facto practice. Such quiet approach steadily building a de facto reality would not, as suggested by Kennan’s formula, “preclude a permanent association with China but would also not assure it or attempt to define what it might conceivably be.” Such approach will allow the possible development of the “one China, one Taiwan” solution more constructively.

    International prescriptions and expectations are all on Taiwan’s side: the right of self-determination and the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in the settlement of international disputes. Donald Trump’s fresh thinking, not bound by orthodox conventions, may help other countries to break away from the “One China” policy many have considered catholic. ###             
























  中華帝国が中国以外の世界から区別されるのは、中国が世界の中心であり、世界の他の諸国は文明化されておらず、これらの未開民族は中華帝国の権威と権力を受け入れている限り、中華帝国の慈悲深い保護と寛大さを享受する生活を許される、という世界観によります。エドワード・ルトワック氏がその著書The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (奥山真司監訳『自滅する中国』)で説明したように、

   「実際のところ、従属する朝貢国に中華帝国が与える最大の利益は、倫理・道徳  的な面と同時に、政治面で中国の勢力範囲、つまり「天下」という同心円圏の中に入れてもらうことであった。「天下」とは、皇帝自身を中心として外に拡がる、「天下の下にある全てのもの」であり、朝貢してきた国を、最低の野蛮な世界に生きている外界の蛮夷たちよりも上位の世界に引き上げてくれるものなのだ。その代わりに朝貢国は恭(うやうや)しく服従することで、皇帝の倫理・道徳面での優位と同時に、政治面での優位も認めるのだ。」 










 ニクソンは莫大な戦略的賭けを打っているということを知っていたのです。つまり進言していることは、短期的には、北京に対して「中国の利益は国際的礼節の基本的ルールを受け入れることによってのみ報いられる」こと説得する政策と、そして長期的には、「中国を国際社会に―それも世界革命の世界の震源地としてではなく、偉大な発展している国として引き戻す」政策を進言しているからです。残念ながら、既にマイケル・ピルズベリー著のThe Hundred-Year Marathon野中香方子訳『China 2049』)に詳細に分析されているように、中国の要求を受け入れつつ中国と取り組み、養い、そして発展させていくという戦略的賭けは期待していた結果を生み出さなかったのです。1989年の天安門事件こそが、産業化したリベラルな民主国家の中国に対する取り組みと強化は何ら政治的自由の改善を創り出さなかった、ということを認識すべき覚醒コールだったのです。「一つの中国」政策を受け入れる根拠の理由は既に長い間その存在価値を失っていたのです。

 中国は国際社会で自国の持つ経済力や軍事力に相応な尊敬と地位を得ることを要求し ています、ちょうど米国との「新しい大国関係」を要求しているのと同じようにです。しかし、国際的に受容されている行動・行為基準の奨励や遵守になると、中国は都合よく開発途上国の姿を見せるだけではなく、国際慣行を無視するのです。







 では台湾は、この中国からの台湾の分離を台湾の独立を宣言することなしに、どのように正当化すべきなのでしょうか。蔡英文台湾総統は就任以来、現状維持政策を継承すると言明しています。従って、するべきことは、展開する現状に対して事実上の現実を漸増的に強化し続けることです。まず、もう国際法上存在しない「中華民国」という名称を使わずに、「台湾」と「台湾人」という名称を使用続けることにより新しい「民族の自己同一認識」(national identity) を創り出すのです。そして他の国々に対してもそうしてもらうように静かに依頼するのです。この事実上の実践行為をするのに何ら公式な指示も法令も必要としないのです。この事実上の現実を着実に強化していく静かなやり方は、ジョージ・ケナンのフオーミュラにあるように、「中国との恒久的な結びつきの可能性を排除もしないし、又保証もせず、それがいったいどんな形になるかを定義することもしない」のです。そのような方法は「一つの中国、一つの台湾」というより建設的な解決策の発展を可能にするのです。


CNN and Alternative Facts



Eisuke Suzuki

Kellyanne Conway #kellyannePolls is correct in saying “alternative facts”. Somebody must conclude “a certain piece of information” has “objective reality.” There are many observers who pontificate “objective reality” as facts are conclusions of observers who collected these pieces of information. Unhappily, the Webster Dictionary conceals who presents that piece of information as having “objective reality.” CNN or Kellyanne Conway?  It was CNN that first omitted Sean Spicer’s phrase “in person and around the globe” that modifies the total audience that witnessed the inaugural event. That omission surely suited CNN to present its own “alternative facts” about the event.  



Taiwan is not part of China

Taiwan is not part of China.

President-elect Donald Trump’s statement that the One-China policy is up for negotiations, I believe, has reasonable ground in United States policy toward China. Let’s review the time line more carefully:

(a)  In the February 28, 1972 Shanghai Communique (the first Shanghai Communique), the United States acknowledged that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was but one China and that Taiwan was a part of China.

(b)  On January 1, 1979 the United States, in officially establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC by the joint communique (the second Shanghai Communique), declared that it “recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.” With it, the United States de-recognized the ROC by severing any official dealings with it.

Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that US recognition of the PRC as “the sole legal government of China” is one thing and the question whether Taiwan is part of China is an entirely separate matter. The second Shanghai Communique itself left the question ambiguous, if not open. The United States merely acknowledged “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” One must ask, what is the US position, then? A US position will change, so will other countries. Remember the United States, after having refused to recognize the PRC for 30 years, suddenly changed its policy. It may be possible for the United States to say that its position is that Taiwan is not part of China!  












 残念ながら、そんなことはお構いなしに、内局の背広組指導の下に「文民統制」(シビリアン・コントロール)は防衛官僚である背広組が制服組を支配することという歪曲した理解の下に自衛隊に関連する法律が今まで創られてきたからです。治安が不安定で国連のPKO部隊の手を借りて秩序を保たなければならないような地域や破綻国家で、自己の生命または身体を防衛するためにやむを得ない必要がある場合とは、相手が危害を加えようとその自衛官のほうに向かってくる時なのです。そのような時に、たとえ武器を構えたとしても、単なる警告や警告射撃だけで十分であるはずがない。にも拘らず、PKO部隊の派遣条件は、戦闘行為が行われておらず、且つ、そこで実施する活動の期間を通じて戦闘行為が行われることがないと認められる地域、つまり「非戦闘地域」であるから、「戦闘地域」で必要になるような武器や装備は必要ないという「言葉」の定義から割り出される机上の結論なのです。 そこには現場での流動的な治安状況の理解などなく、「駆け付け警護」と「宿営地の共同防衛」という新しい任務を課された自衛官の生命、身体の安全を危険に晒しているという自覚などは毛頭ないのです。その証左に1978年7月に起きた当時統合幕僚会議議長であった栗栖弘臣陸将の有事法制の早急な整備を促す発言以降「この問題は全然解決していないのです」(p.44) という。



 本書の痛快な点は、「内閣法制局が、国連軍であれ、多国籍軍であれ、有志連合軍であれ、PKOであれ、要するに集団安全保障に参加して武力行使することを、自衛の問題と勘違いしていることです」(p.219)と内閣法制局憲法解釈が間違っていると指摘することです(p. 217-220)。内閣法制局こそ、刑法第36条で正当防衛として急迫不正の侵害に対して「他人の権利を防衛するため、やむを得ずにした行為」を違法性阻却事由として認め、第37条でも、緊急避難の対象として「他人の生命、身体、自由または財産に対する現在の危機を避けるため」にした行為を認めているのにも拘らず、その独善的な自国と外国という二元論に則り、日本以外の諸外国と共に共有する利益・価値観の認識や、その共通な認識に基づいて協調し行動を起こすという国際協調主義を否定し、恰も日本国憲法が「一国平和主義」を支持奨励している如く、「集団安全保障についてはまったくトンチンカンな」(p. 218) 詭弁を展開してきたのです。

 本書は対談を通じて疑問に答えるというプロセスの中で国際社会の責任ある一員として日本の直面する防衛問題を分かりやすく、明確な説明と解説を提供しています。ただ二人の対談のために時たま用語の混乱が見受けられることです。田原氏は「日中戦争」と言い(p.172-174, 181)、冨澤氏は「支那事変」と正しく言及しているかと思えば (p.167, 173-177,180)、冨澤氏が「日中戦争から太平洋戦争」(p.181) などと口走ると、一貫して「太平洋戦争」(p.4、165、187)と言っていた田原氏も反対に「まさに大東亜戦争の始まる直前ですね」(p.181)とか「それは大東亜戦争と同じことではないか」(p.188)などと興に乗る始末です。まぁ、これも御愛嬌だと思いながら読みました。一方、冨澤氏の単著である単行本『逆説の軍事論』では「太平洋戦争」という言葉は一度だけ「大東亜戦争(太平洋戦争)」(p.209)と出てくるだけで、あとは一貫して「大東亜戦争」と正式な名称を使っているのです(p.208、241)。










   自衛隊は、国内法上何と呼ばれようが、主権国家を主要構成員としている国際社会では立派な軍隊として処遇されています。国内法上、陸上自衛隊の一尉とか一佐などと呼ばれている将校は、一度外国に出れば、あるいは英語で表記される時には、それぞれCaptain(大尉)であり Colonel(大佐)なのです。当然、陸上自衛隊普通科隊員たるものはInfantry(歩兵)部隊であり、国連PKO活動部隊の主流を構成するものです。従って、国連南スーダン・ミッション(UNMISS)が使用する国連PKO局が編纂した「歩兵大隊マニュアル」(United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, Vols. I & II)によれば、工兵が従事しているインフラ作業員とその建設しているインフラ設備・施設本体の護衛任務は歩兵が担っているのです。 第10次までの自衛隊の派遣部隊は他国の歩兵部隊に護られてきたのです。 







   同盟国英国を含めて、2001年から始まったNATO加盟国のアフガニスタン戦争への参加はNATOワシントン条約第5条に基づく 集団的自衛権の発動により行なわれてきたのです。 2001年に始まった同盟国英国のアフガニスタン戦争への参戦は2014年に正式に撤退するまで13年間にも及びました。その間453名の戦死者と総額40兆ポンドの犠牲と代価を払っているのです。にも拘らず、タリバン勢力は根強く、英国軍が撤退した2014年にはアフガニスタン全土でアフガニスタン国軍の4000人以上の兵士が戦死したのが現状です。英国軍の撤退といえども、戦闘員以外の450名の兵士がアフガニスタン国軍に対する後方援助要員として訓練、助言と援助のために残留したのです。そして、2015年にも英国軍は再び50名の兵士を新たに追加投入しました。これが「特別な関係」を維持するために同盟国英国が負う同盟の姿です。


   2015年の「安全保障法制」の成立にともない、「限定的」と云われながらも、原則的に集団的自衛権の行使を認めたことは、国家と国家との間の戦争に同盟国として国連憲章第51条に基づき参戦することではなく、その憲章第七章の下での「強制措置(enforcement action)に関する安保理の権限に抵触しない限りで執られる総会の決議による国連の平和維持活動(PKO)に参加することから発生する「駆け付け警護」などにも直接的に影響をもちます。積極的平和主義を掲げ、国際平和の維持に貢献する政策をとった政府には、兵士をPKOに派遣する結果に対応できる準備と用意ができているのでしょうか。 









(1) 防衛出動の職務に従事する場合

(2) 国民保護等派遣により派遣される場合


(4) 治安出動下令前に内閣総理大臣の承認を得て行う情報収集の職務に従事する場合

(5) 海上における警備行動に従事する場合

(6) 海賊対処行動に従事する場合

(7) 災害派遣により派遣される場合

(8) 地震防災派遣により派遣される場合

(9) 原子力災害派遣により派遣される場合














   さらに、「国際連合平和維持活動等に対する協力に関する法律」の下で国連平和維持活動に派遣された部隊の下で国連の業務に従事する場合と「国際機関等に派遣される防衛省の職員の処遇等に関する法律」の下で 派遣された隊員が、同法第2条第2項第1号から第5号までに掲げる業務に従事する場合、と異質な任務内容の業務を混入しています。


    「警察・消防職員の場合は、大部分が地方公務員  であるため、当該地方公共団体および国からそれぞれ賞じゅつ金が授与され、結果として、警察・消防職員と自衛隊員その他の国家公務員との間に賞じゅつ金に関して大きな格差が生じている。」 



















A View from Tokyo on Mr. Trump’s Victory



Eisuke Suzuki

The world changed at night of November 8, 2016 (in Tokyo). It is no longer the same world we knew in the evening of November 8. Major media, print and broadcasting alike, misread completely the sentiment of, and the real issues involved in, what Donald Trump referred to as “the Movement.”

   Issues are not so much about free trade as how it has been conducted. People traded from time immemorial. Without trade one can neither earn money nor exchange for other goods and produces. Free trade benefits most by promoting such free exchange. Everybody would like to have a fair share in free trade and the benefit of globalization. But the reality is a growing divide between those who leap from free trade and those who have been left behind. The former rides with the wave of globalization and the latter has lost its jobs because home industries have moved out to developing countries seeking cheaper overhead. They are forgotten people of the hollowed valley.

   Globalization benefits primarily those who have; it is inherently advantageous for the strong and powerful. It is an arena for gladiators. It is an open field, and the prize to the strongest. The entire ethical foundation of free competition is built at the expense of the weak and unfit. Darwinism is the mistress of free trade. The premium attached to the ability to make adjustments to a changing environment and emphasis on productivity and efficiency by streamlining business processes underpin the development of neo-Darwinism, leaving in its wake those who have lost their jobs in the hollowed valley that used to be green.

   They are decent, hard-working middle class people, whom Hillary Clinton characterized as either “desperate for change” or belonging in “the basket of deplorables,” saying that they were “racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, you name it.” And Donald Trump was made an epitome of what all these labels stood for. But the moment we stop to think, it becomes obvious that they are false and do not convey what Mr. Trump really is. He runs his business. He cannot sell his goods by insulting customers; nor can he manage his organization by humiliating his staff. He cannot discriminate one group of employees against other groups.

   In her concession speech, Hillary Clinton eviscerated the central issue of those forgotten people in the valley by saying that “I know we have still not shattered that highest and hardest glass ceiling,” and said, “To all of the little girls who are watching this, never doubt that you are valuable and powerful and deserving of every chance and opportunity in the world to pursue and achieve your own dreams.”  

   Hillary’s problem was not the glass ceiling, but her personality, that had not allowed her to break the popularity ceiling. Forgotten people in the valley who were “desperate for change” like those in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, all traditional states of Democrats, whom Hillary had ignored, went for Trump, who they knew spoke their mind. The Republican’s large gains in the Senate and the House, not to mention the Governors, attest to the clamor of those forgotten people. They did not want the same policies of the establishment, of which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is quintessentially a part. Those women who did not vote for Hillary saw her through. She is more of the same old dynastic political class that on the whole treats the little people of the valley with contempt. The media is part of that establishment which ignored them. Listening to CNN talking about hidden Trump supporters after the event sucks.

   Election rhetoric during the campaign is different from what can be said and done after the candidate assumes office. Remember candidate Barack Obama’s pledge in 2008 to close the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay as his first act of the President? After eight years in office the Guantanamo facility has not been closed yet. Once in office, the President must satisfy a variety of competing and crisscrossing interest. The Office itself has its own procedures, traditions and institutional constraints, which invariably restrict freedom of action as President. In short, the office makes the man.

   The impact of Mr. Trump’s victory on Japan would be good. The Trump administration would shake up Japan’s leadership out of its complacency as well as dependency on the United States not only in security matters, but also trade and economic relations. Though Mr. Trump’s understanding of security arrangements between the United States and Japan leaves much to be desired, his campaign rhetoric has definitely reminded Japanese afresh of the need for us to defend ourselves.

   With the Republican majority both in the Senate and the House, the prospect of approving the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) seems quite dim for the time being. Without the United States participation, the TPP does not seem viable, and that reality would at the same time risk the further rise of China in the Pacific region militarily and economically. It would destabilize the region. In the end the realistic assessment of the China question would pave the way for the TPP to be approved eventually. Japan can play its constructive role in this process of upholding the principle of free trade.  

   Let us hope that Mr. President-elect will act as President of the United States as a champion of human rights and democracy, who promotes comity among nations and is responsible for the conduct of international affairs in accordance with international law. ###